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Abstract. We present a framework that unifies several standard differ-
ential techniques. This unified view allows us to consider many, poten-
tially all, output differences for a given input difference and to combine
the information derived from them in an optimal way. We then propose
a new attack that implicitly mounts several standard, truncated, impos-
sible, improbable and possible future variants of differential attacks in
parallel and hence allows to significantly improve upon known differential
attacks using the same input difference. To demonstrate the viability of
our techniques, we apply them to KATAN-32. In particular, our attack
allows us to break 115 rounds of KATAN-32, which is 37 rounds more
than previous work. For this, our attack exploits the non-uniformity of
the difference distribution after 91 rounds which is 20 rounds more than
the previously best known differential characteristic. Since our results
still cover less than 1/2 of the cipher, they further strengthen our confi-
dence in KATAN-32’s resistance against differential attacks.
Keywords. symmetric cryptography, block cipher, differential attack
1 Introduction
Block ciphers are fundamental building blocks of modern cryptography
and some of the best understood objects in the area of symmetric cryptog-
raphy. Compared to, say, stream ciphers and hash functions, the design
of a secure block cipher can rely on many established design principles to
achieve security against all known attacks; most prominently linear and
differential attacks.
? An extended abstract of this work will appear in the proceedings of SAC 2012
However, designing a secure block cipher that, at the same time, is very
efficient (in hardware) is still challenging. In particular, lightweight cryp-
tography which recently received considerable attention from the cryp-
tographic community calls for block ciphers that can be efficiently im-
plemented even in very resource constrained devices. Designing secure
ciphers for such tiny devices – e.g., RFID tags or sensor networks – re-
quires, on the one hand, innovative design strategies and, on the other
hand, perhaps compromises in the security level. One such constraint is
the block size used in block ciphers. As the block size, along with the key
size, greatly influences the required circuit size, block ciphers tailored to
be implemented in small devices have a strong tendency to feature smaller
block sizes compared to modern block ciphers mainly focusing on soft-
ware such as the AES. While modern block ciphers focusing on software
usually have a block size of no less than 128 bits, most ciphers designed
for efficient implementations in hardware have block sizes of 64 bits or less
(see for example PRESENT [7] or HIGHT [11]). A block cipher with a
particular small block size of 32-bit is KATAN-32 [9] presented at CHES
2009.
Block ciphers with very small block sizes have some interesting character-
istics. From the point of view of the attacker, when using the block cipher
in counter mode, it is possible to distinguish the output from a random
sequences faster. Similarly, an attacker can build a complete code book
faster and time-memory tradeoffs are a greater concern. From the per-
spective of the designer, most statistical attacks like differential or linear
cryptanalysis seem at first glance to become more difficult as the amount
of data available to the attacker is much more restricted.
Finally, from a theoretical point of view, small block sizes provide the
opportunity to understand well-established attacks better since compu-
tations involving the entire code-book are feasible. In particular, for dif-
ferential cryptanalysis, it becomes feasible to compute the exact expected
probabilities for many (sometimes all) differentials. This data then allows
to study the behaviour of (classical) differential cryptanalysis and related
techniques more precisely.
Yet, it is not obvious a priori how to provide an optimal unified view on
these differentials even if this data is available. To provide an answer to
this question, this work investigates the probability distribution of output
differences under one (or many) input difference and provides an optimal
way to use the non-uniform distribution of differences in an attack.
1.1 Prior Work
Differential cryptanalysis was first proposed by Biham and Shamir [3]
and since became one of the most prominent tools in the analysis of
block ciphers. Many improvements and extensions have been proposed
in the past, we mention some of the most influential ones. Knudsen [14]
and later Biham, Biryukov and Shamir [2] proposed to use differentials
with zero probability, that is impossible differential attacks. Based on the
work of Lai [16] High-order differentials were introduced in [15] and are
most effective against ciphers where the algebraic degree can be limited.
Truncated differentials, first mentioned in [15] can be seen as a collection
of differentials and in some cases allow to push differential attacks one
or two rounds further. Boomerang attacks can be viewed as special cases
of second order differentials and are most efficient when the probability
of any differential drops rapidly with an increasing number of rounds.
Recently, improbable differentials have been suggested [21] as a natural
extension of impossible differentials and have been successfully applied
to the block cipher CLEFIA. Also recently, differential cryptanalysis was
extended to multi-differential cryptanalysis in [5]. Finally, our application
of the log-likelihood can be seen in the framework of [20].
1.2 Our Contribution
Abstractly, differential cryptanalysis exposes a non-uniform distribution
of output differences given one (or several) input differences. This is also
the point of view from which our investigation sets out. Phrased in these
terms, recovering key information using differential techniques becomes
the task of distinguishing between distributions, one for the right key
and one for the wrong keys. However, usually the attacker does not have
access to a full description of these distributions. In standard differential
cryptanalysis only one output difference is considered and usually the
probability of the best differential characteristic is considered in place of
the probability of the output differential. Furthermore, for wrong keys it
is assumed that the distribution is uniform.
In comparison the advantage of an attacker when dealing with small
block-size ciphers become apparent. The attacker has, under mild as-
sumptions, the ability to compute the parameters of those distributions
precisely. Thus, the task is no longer to distinguish (essentially) unknown
distributions, but distributions which are known completely. In particu-
lar, the usual hypotheses that wrong keys result in random permutations
can be lifted. To this end, we first introduce a model to study and dis-
tinguish these distributions. As an important side effect, our framework
unifies and generalises standard differential attacks, impossible differen-
tials, improbable differentials and truncated differentials into one attack
framework. Since our framework considers the distribution of all output
differences it captures all techniques which exploit statistically significant
subspaces of the output space.
We then propose a new attack based on this model that implicitly mounts
several standard, truncated, impossible, improbable and possible future
variants of differential attacks in parallel and hence allows to significantly
improve upon known differential attacks using the same input difference.
We stress that these “parallel applications” of various differential attacks
are such that they are strictly better than those attacks considered in-
dependently. To demonstrate the viability of our model and attack, we
apply our attack to two ciphers with small block sizes: the toy-cipher
SmallPresent[4] and KATAN-32. For KATAN-32 we present the best
known differential attack.1 In particular, our attack allows us to break
115 rounds of KATAN-32, which is 37 rounds more than previous work
[13]. For this, our attack exploits the non-uniformity of the difference
distribution after 91 rounds which is 20 rounds more than the previ-
ously best known differential characteristic. Since our results takes into
account several standard techniques and still cover less than 1/2 of the
cipher, they further strengthen our confidence in KATAN-32’s resistance
against differential attacks. For completeness, we also like to mention a
recent preprint [12] using a meet-in-the-middle variant to recover the key
for KATAN (slightly) faster than exhaustive search.
Furthermore, our model allows to combine many input- and output-
differences which allows to reduce the data complexity compared to pre-
vious works significantly. This is mainly due to the fact that our approach
almost naturally provides the optimal way of combining information from
several input and output differences. This is the major difference between
our work and [5]. Finally, we also discuss variants and possible extensions
to ciphers with larger block sizes.
1 Our attack is also the best known differential attack on SmallPresent[4].
We highlight that similar approaches have been independently developed
by Blondeau, Gérard and Nyberg [6] and Murphy [19]. While these ap-
proaches also differ in some theoretical respects (such as using the likeli-
hood instead of the likelihood ratio in the latter case), the main difference
between these works and ours is that we put our model to practice and
use it to improve upon known attacks.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
In this work we focus on block ciphers where the key is XORed to (parts
of) the state. Let Rk denote one round function of a block cipher with
(round)-key k, where without loss of generality the key is added in last.
By R we denote the round function without the final key addition, that
is Rk(x) = R(x)⊕ k. Moreover let EK : Fn2 → Fn2 be the corresponding r
round block cipher, where K = (k0, k1, . . . , kr) consist of all round keys.
More precisely
EK(x) = Rkr ◦Rkr−1 ◦ · · · ◦Rk1(x⊕ k0).
For a function F : Fn2 → Fn2 given an input difference δ and an output
difference γ we denote
PF (δ, γ) := Pr(F (X)⊕ F (X ⊕ δ) = γ)
for randomly uniformly chosen X. That is, PF (δ, γ) is the probability of
the differential δ → γ. Using N (unordered) pairs, the number of pairs




The expected value of D
(N)
F (δ, γ) = NPF (δ, γ) and we discuss below more
precisely how D
(N)
F (δ, γ) is distributed.
Note that in the following N always denotes the number of (unordered)
plaintext/ciphertext pairs used. As we use unordered pairs, using the full
code book corresponds to choosing N = 2n−1.
We consider the case where E is a Markov cipher. A cipher E is a Markov
cipher when the transitional probabilities for the output differences of
round r+1 only depend on the output difference of round r. More precisely
the round function has to satisfy [17]:
Pr(Rk(X)⊕Rk(X ⊕ δ) = γ | X = x0) = PRk(δ, γ)
for all choices of x0 and uniformly random chosen subkeys k. If, further-
more, all round keys are independent, then one can compute the average
value of PEK (δ, γ) over all possible keys by adding the probabilities for all
differential characteristics included in the differential. This has first been
formalised in [17] and is summarised in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. For a function EK : Fn2 → Fn2 = Rkr ◦ Rkr−1 ◦ · · · ◦
Rk1(x⊕k0) with input difference δ, output difference γ and PR(γ′, δ′) the














The hypothesis of stochastic equivalence states (cf. [17]) that for almost
all keys we expect PEK (δ, γ) ≈ P̃E(δ, γ) which implies that D
(N)
K (δ, γ) ≈
NP̃E(δ, γ) for almost all keys.
This approximation has to be understood as expected value taken over
all expanded keys. However, for our purpose, we are not only interested
in the expected value of the counter D
(N)
EK
(δ, γ) but moreover how these
values are distributed. This was analysed in [10] and more recently in
[4]. It turns out, considering D
(N)
EK
(δ, γ) as the results of N independent
Bernoulli trials with success probability P̃E(δ, γ) leads to a precise model
of the actual distribution. More precisely, denoting by B(n, p) the Bino-
mial distribution with n tries and success probability p, the following is




Assumption 1 (cf. Theorem 14 in [10]) The counter D
(N)
EK
(δ, γ) is dis-











where the probability is taken over random keys K.
We note that we experimentally validated this assumption for all ciphers
considered in this work.
2.1 P̃EK(δ, γ) in Differential Cryptanalysis
In standard differential cryptanalysis the attacker attempts to find an in-
put difference and an output difference such that P̃EK (δ, γ) is “sufficiently
high”, i.e., bounded away from uniform. In this case we can expect that,
with high probability, for each key K there exist sufficiently many right
pairs to mount an attack, i.e., to detect the bias of P̃EK (δ, γ). Tradition-
ally, in a 1R attack on the cipher Rkr+1 ◦EK one (partially) decrypts the
last round with all possible (partial) round keys and increases a counter
for the current round key guess iff the computed difference fits the ex-
pected output difference γ of round r. Afterwards, the keys are ranked
according to their counters, that is, the attacker first tries the key with
the highest counter, than the one with the second highest counter, etc.
The success probability of a differential attack is usually computed under
the Wrong-Key Randomization Hypotheses. The Wrong-Key Randomiza-
tion Hypotheses (see for example [17]) states that for a wrong key guess
the corresponding counter is distributed as for a random permutation.
Using the notation established above the Wrong-Key Randomization Hy-
potheses can be stated as follows





(δ, γ) ∼ B(N, 2−n)
for all k′ 6= kr+1.
2.2 Distinguishing Distributions
Following the above discussion on the distribution of counter values, it
is natural to view a differential attack as a technique to find the value
kr+1 which maximises the likelihood function corresponding to the right-
key distribution (Maximum Likelihood Estimation). This estimation may
take two distributions into account. For the right key guess, according
to Assumption 1 the counter is distributed according to B(N, P̃E(δ, γ))
while the counter of a wrong key guess is assumed (cf. Assumption 2) to
be distributed accordingly to B(N, 2−n).
In this setting, the maximum likelihood estimation is equivalent to max-
imising the log-likelihood ratio of the two distributions under considera-
tion. Indeed, by the Neyman-Pearson Lemma the log-likelihood ratio is
the most poweful test to determine whether a sample comes from one of
two distributions. Denoting p = P̃E(δ, γ) and q = 2
−n, if a key K resulted
























The key guesses are ranked according to their lk(c) values, that is, the
key with highest lk(c) value is tested first. To simplify the computation
one can equivalently rank the keys according to






as we are only interested in the relative value of lk(c).
We may write lk′ and l
′
k′ for lk′(c) and l
′
k′(c) respectively if it is clear from
the context which c we are referring to.
Now, observe that l′k(c) is monotone increasing iff p > q (as in this case
w > 0). Thus, if the expected counter for the right key is higher than
for wrong key guesses then l′k has the same ranking and the rankings
accordingly to l′k(c) and c is the same. However, if p < q the function
is monotone decreasing (as w < 0) and the ranks get reversed. This
corresponds to improbable differentials as defined in [21]. The special case
where p = 0 corresponds to impossible differentials (as introduced in [14]
and later used in [2]), as in this case for each counter c 6= 0 the value
lk(c) is formally minus infinity. In the latter case we use the convention
w = −∞ and 0 · w = 0. To conclude, we state the following observation.
Observation 1 Ranking keys according to their maximum likelihood es-
timation as defined in Equation (2) unifies in a natural way standard
differential attacks, impossible differentials and improbable differentials.
As explained in the next section, it is this unified view that allows for a





3 The Attack Model
In this section, we present our attack in detail and provide formulas for




(δ, γ) for different δ and γ values simultaneously. We view
those counters as samples from one out of two possible (this time multi-
dimensional) distributions. One distribution corresponds to the correct
round-key guess and the other to the wrong key guesses. Using many
counters at the same time allows us to significantly improve the success
probability (or – equivalently – reduce the data complexity) compared to
standard differential attacks. Informally, and this is the major difference
and biggest improvement over a related approach performed in [5], this
allows us to perform several standard differential attacks and impossible
(or more generally improbable) differential attacks at the same time. In
our attacks these simultaneous differential attacks are weighted appro-
priately ensuring that we do not lose information compared to standard
attacks. That is, considering more information never reduces the success
probability but strictly improves it.




While in general any subset of pairs of input/output differences could be
considered, here we focus on the case where one input difference is fixed









(δ, 2), . . . , D
(N)
EK
(δ, 2n − 1)
)
the vector of all corresponding counters. As discussed in Section 2, each
individual counter is distributed according to a binomial distribution
B(N, P̃E(δ, γ)). As each pair of the N pairs with input difference δ re-





(δ, γ) = N .
Thus, assuming that this is the only dependency between the counter












(δ, γ) ∼ Multi(N, P̃EK (δ)).
Later in this work we present experimental evidence comparing the em-
pirical and theoretical gain of the attack to justify this assumption for
the ciphers considered in this work. We summarise our assumption on
the behaviour below.
Assumption 3 D(N)EK (δ) follows a multinomial distribution where each





(δ, γ) = N.
In contrast to previous works, we do not rely on the Wrong-Key Ran-
domization Hypotheses (Assumption 2) for our attack. Before mounting
our attack, the attacker has to compute the expected probability (or the
expected counter value) for all possible output differences (cf Section 3.3).
If the attacker is able to do this, he is usually also able to compute the





(δ, γ) as this is essentially computing two more rounds.
3.2 The Attack Algorithm
First, recall that the attack uses N plaintext/ciphertext pairs, to recover
the secret key.
Following the previous section, we assume that the attacker has – in an
offline phase – computed the parameters of two distributions.2 Namely,
vectors of parameters p and q such that
pi = P̃E(δ, i) (3)
qi = P̃R−1◦R◦E(δ, i). (4)
That is, for a right key the vector of counters is a sample from the distri-
bution
Dist1 = Multi(N, p)
2 We discuss how efficienty compute this data in Section 3.3.
and for the wrong keys sampled from the distribution
Dist2 = Multi(N, q).
After this pre-computation phase, the attack proceeds as follows (a brief
overview is given in Algorithm 1).
For all possible last round keys k′, the attacker first computes the vector
of difference counters D(N)
R−1
k′ ◦Rkr+1◦EK
(δ). That is, given the guess for the
last round key, the attacker partially decrypts every ciphertext and for
all output differences γ computes the number of pairs fulfilling the differ-
ential δ → γ. Next, the attacker estimates the likelihood that the vector
was sampled from Dist1. In our case, this is equivalent to computing the
difference of the log-likelihood of the vector with respect to Dist1 and
with respect to Dist2, i.e., to compute the log-likelihood-ratio.
Given that for a random variable X following a multinomial distribution
X ∼ Multi(M,p) it holds that





































This is a weighted extension of the case where one considers only one
counter. As before these weights naturally capture various types of differ-
ential attacks, i.e., in each component one considers a standard differen-
tial, improbable or impossible differential attack. Furthermore, truncated
differentials are captured in this model since these correspond to a sub-
vector of D(N)EK (δ).
The time complexity of Algorithm 1 is |K ′| ·N where N is the number of
pairs considered and |K ′| is the number of all last-round subkeys.
Input: δ an input difference
Output: A ranking of all possible last-round-keys according to their
log-likelihood ratio
1 begin
2 K′ ← the set of all last-round subkeys;
3 for k′ ∈ K′ do













6 R← sorted key candidates k′ according to l′k′ ;
7 return R
Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code of the attack
3.3 Computing the Markov Model
Computing the vectors p and q is equivalent to repeated (black-box)
matrix-vector products A × v where A is a 2n × 2n matrix over Q and
v ∈ Q2n holds the input probabilities for each difference. If our cipher is
an SP-network, we have that A = PS where S is a 2n × 2n block diag-
onal matrix over Q with difference distribution matrices along the main
diagonal and P is a permutation matrix . Thus, the matrix A can be rep-
resented using much less than O(2n2) storage. More generally, the matrix
A is efficiently representable because block ciphers (especially small-scale
block ciphers) are designed to have small circuits. However, the size of
each component vi ∈ Q for 1 ≤ i < 2n will grow during the computation.
More precisely, if we need b bits to represent the entries of the S-box
difference distribution matrix of an s-bit S-box, then we need r · s · b bits
per entry to represent entries of the vector p and (r + 2) · s · b bits to
represent entries of the vector q. Thus, the total storage requirement for
p and q is 2n(2r + 2) · s · b bits. For ciphers with a 32-bit block size this
quickly exhausts available RAM. Compression and approximation may
delay the growth but cannot necessarily guarantee sufficient precision.
However, given sufficient harddisk space, a standard approach in efficient
linear algebra is to use multimodular techniques (and the Chinese remain-
der theorem) to compute the output vector v as a series of representations
modulo different primes vi,pj , where pj is a word sized prime. Then, when
the value vi is needed, it is computed on the fly from vi,pj by applying the
Chinese remainder theorem. This is the approach we also used in all our
experiments. For example, our attacks on KATAN-32 (see below) require
≈100GB of harddisk space and six 32-bit primes to represent p.
3.4 Computing the Gain of the Attack
What remains to be discussed is the efficiency of this attack. The key
observation (cf. also [1]) is that the distribution of lk′ can be well ap-
proximated by a normal distribution in the case where all values wi are
relatively close together. The case where all wi are close to uniform is
the most interesting case for our attack, as otherwise standard differen-
tial techniques, considering only one counter are sufficient to break the
cipher. Recall that there are two distributions to be considered. First,
there is a random variable (and a corresponding distribution) for the log-
likelihood-ratio of the right key. We denote this random variable by R








By Assumption 3 we expect D(N)EK (δ) to be multinomial distributed with
parameters N and (pi)i, with pi defined in Equation (3). Hence the ex-




Using that the pairwise covariances for a multinomial distribution is











Therefore, denoting by N (E, V ) the normal distribution with expected












which we will justify with experimental results later in this work.
For the wrong keys, we introduce a random variableW and, following the
same lines of argumentation, we approximate the distribution of W with












with qi as defined in Equation (4). This enables to estimate the gain of the
attack. For this, we assume that the right key value is sampled according
to R. As the normal distribution is symmetric, with a probability of
1/2, the result is larger or equal to E(R). For the wrong keys values
are sampled from W. For 50% percent of the keys, computing the gain
is now reduced to computing the probability that W ≥ E(R), as this
corresponds to an upper bound on to the probability that a wrong key is








this probability of a wrong key being ranked higher than the right key is
given by




Using the relation of the standard Normal distribution and the Gaussian
error function, this can be rewritten as









The probability Pr(W ≥ E(R)) is visualised as the filled, and hence




Fig. 1. Computation of the gain.
Note that this approach allows to easily modify the computation in the
case where the attacker wants to obtain an error probability for the 10
percent weakest keys (or 90 percent of the keys). In general, to study a



















Moreover, this statement of gain relative to the fraction of the keys to
which it applies provides more meaningful information than the average
gain for all keys, as the average is, in principle, much more sensitive
to outliers. That is to say that even if the average gain is very small,
there might still be a non-negligible fraction of keys for which the gain is
relatively high.
3.5 Some Variants and Improvements
More Input Differences A straight-forward extension which does not
require any change to the analysis above is to use a different subset
of input- and output-differences. In particular, the attack might bene-
fit from not only using one vector D(N)EK (δ) but several such vectors for
several choices of δ. We followed this approach in our experiments against
SmallPRESENT-[4].
Considering Subvectors In order to reduce the computational and
memory cost of the online phase of the attack, it might beneficial to only
consider the most significant components (bounded away from uniform)
of the D(N)EK (δ) vector. Again, this can also be done for more than one
input difference.
No Key Guessing We may improve the computational and storage
requirements of the online phase of the attack by avoiding guessing key
bits in the last rounds. That is, we may recover key information from the
first rounds. Instead of computing two distributions (one for the right and
one for the wrong key) under one input difference δ for the first round, we
compute s distributions, one for each possible output difference of the first
round. We then encrypt N plaintext pairs following the δ and perform a
Maximum Likelihood Estimation for s distributions and the key counter
array as data. That is, we estimate which of the s distributions matches
our observed data best. If Distj(δj , γi) fits the observed data best and δj
occurs with probability 2−b, then this recovers b bits of information about
the key if successful.
4 Application
In this section, we apply our framework to two blockciphers with very
small block sizes. First, we consider SmallPRESENT-[4] to demonstrate
the idea and then we consider reduced round variants of KATAN-32 for
which we present the currently best known attack.
4.1 Toy Example SmallPRESENT-[4]
SmallPRESENT-[s] [18] is a small-scale (toy) cipher designed to aid the
development and verification of cryptanalysis techniques. The cipher is
an SP-network with s parallel 4-bit S-box applications. Hence the block
size is 4s. The permutation layer is a simple permutation of wires. We
focus on SmallPRESENT-[4], the version with 16 bit block size, as this
allows us to derive sufficient experimental data rather quickly. The S-box
S is the same as for PRESENT (cf. [7]) itself and the round keys are
independent. For more details we refer to [18]. A standard differential
attack, with one round of partial decryption, seems feasible for not more
than 7 rounds. By looking at all the whole vector of output differences, we
are able to break 9 rounds with a significant gain. Moreover, compared to
standard differential attacks, the data complexity for 7 rounds is reduced
by a factor of 25. We summarise our findings for attacking 7, 8 and 9
rounds below.
Attacking 7 Rounds of SmallPRESENT-[4] The best 6 round differ-
ential for one active S-box is δ = 0x0007, γ = 0x0404 where P̃E(δ, γ) =
2−13.57 which is still sufficient to mount a standard differential attack.
Using the full code book, our approach gives E(R) = 53.821, V (R) =
124.087, E(W) = −47.289 and V (W) = 84.237 which implies a gain of
 216 for 50% of the keys. Indeed, in 100 experiments we always recov-
ered the correct key (rank=0). Even when using only 29 pairs, which for
a standard differential attack would not be sufficient, we expect a gain of
more than 3.5.
Attacking 8 Rounds of SmallPRESENT-[4] The best 7 round differ-
ential for one active S-box is δ = 0x0007, γ = 0x0505 where P̃E(δ, γ) =
2−15.39 which is not sufficient to mount a standard differential attack.
Our model gives E(R) = 2.225, V (R) = 4.611, E(W) = −2.149, V (W) =
4.152 which implies a gain of 25.97 for 50% of the keys. In 100 experiments
the median of right key ranks was below 216−6 = 210. More precisely, in
100 experiments we got 1 ranks < 20, 2 ranks < 21, 3 ranks < 22, 5 ranks
< 23, 8 ranks < 24, 11 ranks < 25, 16 ranks < 26, 25 ranks < 27, 31
ranks < 28, 42 ranks < 29 and 52 ranks < 210. Using N = 214, N = 213,
N = 212 and N = 211 we get a gain of 3.954, 2.821, 2.159 and 1.758 re-
spectively. Using more than one input difference and the full code book,
namely 0x0007, 0x000f, 0x0700, 0x0070 and 0x0f00 we expect a gain of
218.03 for 50% of the keys. In 100 experiments we got median 0.0. More
precisely, we got 57 times rank 0, 65 ranks < 2, 73 ranks < 22, 79 ranks
< 23, 82 ranks < 24, 84 ranks < 25, 88 ranks < 26, 91 ranks < 27, 95
ranks < 28, and 96 ranks < 29.
Attacking 9 Rounds of SmallPRESENT-[4] The best 8 round differ-
ential for one active S-box is δ = 0x0007, γ = 0x5055 where P̃E(δ, γ) =
2−15.92 which is not sufficient to mount a standard differential attack.
Our model gives E(R) = 0.057, V (R) = 0.113, E(W) = −0.056, V (W) =
0.112 which implies a gain of 21.44 for 50% of the keys. Indeed, for 100
experiments the median rank was 23578.5 ≈ 216−1.44. More precisely, we
got 1 rank < 25, 3 ranks < 28, 4 ranks < 210, 5 ranks < 211, 12 ranks
< 212, 20 ranks < 213, 32 ranks < 214 and 52 ranks < 216−1.44. Using all
sixty input differences where one S-box is active in round one, we expect
a gain of 24.625. Which is better than exhaustive key search (over half the
key space) by a factor of 23.625. 1 sample with rank zero (2.33%), 2 ranks
< 24 (4.65%), 5 ranks < 25 (11.63%), 6 ranks < 26 (13.95%), 10 ranks
< 27 (23.26%), 17 ranks < 28 (39.53%), 20 ranks < 29 (46.51%), 25 ranks
< 210 (58.14%), 27 ranks < 211 (62.79%), 30 ranks < 212 (69.77%), 37
ranks < 213 (86.05%) and 42 ranks < 214 (97.67%). All ranks were < 215.
For 50% of the keys we got rank < 579 ≈ 216−6.82.
4.2 Application to KATAN32
KATAN-32 is one member of a family of ciphers defined in [9]. It has a
block-size of 32 bits, an 80 bit key and 254 rounds. The plaintext is loaded
into two registers of length 13 and 19, respectively. In each round, two bits
of the registers are updated, involving one key bit each. We refer to [9] for
more information. The currently best know differential attack on KATAN-
32 is a conditional differential attack that can break up to 78 rounds (see
[13]). The best attack overall breaks the full cipher slightly faster than
exhaustive key search [12]. Note that, for KTANTAN-32, which differers
from KATAN-32 only in the key-scheduling, better attacks are known
(see [8,22]) but they do not apply to KATAN-32.
Our contributions with respect to KATAN-32 are twofold. One the one
hand, we present an attack on 115 rounds of the cipher, which is the best
known cryptanalytic result so far. On the other hand, we computed the
complete distribution of output differences – and hence the probabilities
for all output differences – for various numbers of rounds3. Compared to
the probability of the best differential characteristic, these probabilities
are (as expected) higher, however, our results indicate that there is no
significant clustering of trails for KATAN-32 that could be used in a
standard differential attack. Thus, KATAN-32 still provided a sufficiently
high security margin and our results strengthen the confidence in the
security of the cipher.
Below, we always assume δ = 0x1006a880 which is the input difference
for the best known differential characteristic which holds with probability
2−31 after 71 rounds disregarding any dependencies. Note, however that
the special structure of KATAN-32 means that in fact the first proba-
bilistic difference only depends on the plaintext values and not on the
key values.
We consider a ` = 24R attack below to maximise the number of rounds.
This implies a computational cost of 232 · 22` = 232+48 = 280 partial
decryptions in the online phase of the attack. Exhaustive search over half
the key space would have to perform 279 full encryptions where one full
encryption costs roughly 4 partial decryptions. Hence, our attacks are
3 Computing this requires roughly one day of computation time on a 2.6 Ghz PC
given 32 GB of RAM with our implementation.
twice as fast as exhaustive search. However, we emphasise that compared
to exhaustive search the gain in our attack is significantly smaller.
71 + 24 Rounds of KATAN-32 The best output difference γ =
0x00000008 has probability P̃E(δ, γ) ≈ 2−29.52, the output difference with
the lowest probability is γ̃ = 0x00000080 with P̃E(δ, γ) ≈ 2−32.10. We get
E(R) ≈ 2505.2110272, V (R) ≈ 5096.6607713, E(W) ≈ −2467.4478539,
V (W) ≈ 4868.2802123. Which gives an expected gain of > 50 for 50% of










1 5 10 15 20
Fig. 2. Expected gain for increasing number of output differences for 71 rounds of
KTANTAN-32.
We verified this estimate by considering the 16 differences with the high-
est probability. We compared randomly chosen right keys with randomly
chosen wrong keys and always recovered the right key as the key with the
highest rank.
88 + 24 Rounds of KATAN-32 The best output difference γ =
0x02000004 has probability P̃E(δ, γ) ≈ 2−31.97, the output difference with
the lowest probability is γ̃ = 0x00200000 with P̃E(δ, γ̃) ≈ 2−32.01. We get
E(R) ≈ 0.7203661, V (R) ≈ 1.4407603, E(W) ≈ −0.7203574, V (W) ≈
1.4406867. Which gives an expected gain of 3.1201916 for 50% of the keys.
90 + 24 Rounds of KATAN-32 The best output difference γ =
0x08080015 has probability P̃E(δ, γ) ≈ 2−31.99, the output difference with
the lowest probability is γ̃ = 0x08000000 with P̃E(δ, γ̃) ≈ 2−32.01. We get
E(R) ≈ 0.3750060, V (R) ≈ 0.7500168, E(W) ≈ −0.3750042, V (W) ≈
0.7500035. Which gives an expected gain of 2.3715683 for 50% of the keys.
91 + 24 Rounds of KATAN-32 The best output difference γ =
0x00400000 has probability P̃E(δ, γ) ≈ 2−31.98, the output difference with
the lowest probability is γ̃ = 0x02000000 with P̃E(δ, γ̃) ≈ 2−32.00. We get
E(R) ≈ 0.3695390, V (R) ≈ 0.7390803, E(W) ≈ −0.3695384, V (W) ≈
0.7390745. Which gives an expected gain of 2.3586180 for 50% of the keys.
The expected gain for 50% of the keys for 92 and 94 rounds is 1.9220367
and 1.2306869 respectively.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
In this work we presented a unifying framework for several standard dif-
ferential attacks. This unified view allows to naturally consider multiple
differentials and by that improving upon known results. Our framework
always provides better success probabilities than any of the combined dif-
ferential attacks alone; although at the potential cost of increased com-
putation time and memory. We demonstrated the viability of our ap-
proach by extending the the best differential for SmallPRESENT-[4] by
two rounds and the best known differential for KATAN-32 by 20 rounds.
However, for many ciphers computing the distribution of counter values,
i.e., D(N)EK (δ), is prohibitively expensive. Yet, starting from one difference
computing one or two rounds is usually feasible since only few output
differences are possible after such a small number of rounds. It is thus
possible to extend a standard differential attack using techniques dis-
cussed in this. Instead of considering D(N)EK (δ) the attacker would consider
D(N)Rkr (δ). Then, in the online phase of the attack counters are weighted
accordingly to their distribution. We leave the details of such an approach
open for further investigation.
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A Computation of the Variance of R
Assume that we are given a random variable X following a multinomial
distribution with parameters M and p and constants wi. We explain (cf.




Note that if X is multinomial distributed, the covariance between two
compontents Xi and Xj is given by
Cov(Xi, Xj) =
{
−Mpipj if i 6= j
Mpi(1− pi) if i = j



































































which is exactly what we apply in this work.
